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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16018

-vsLYNN DELL NOREN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding him
guilty of Fraudulent Handling of a Recordable Writing in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503 (1953) , as amended.
The charge was based on appellant's filing of articles of
incorporation for Nordell Financial Service with the
Secretary of State after forging two signatures upon said
articles of incorporation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
presiding, on July 13, 14 and 17, 1978.

Appellant was
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convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503 (1953),
as amended, a felony of the third degree.

Pursuant to

the verdict, Judge Croft sentenced appellant to an
indeterminate term of from 0-5 years imprisonment in
the Utah State Prison, and imposed a fine of $5,000.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment
and sentence pronounced by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the years 1974 through 1976, the appellant
operated a used car dealership called World of Autos located
in Salt Lake County (R.300,341,343,253).

Ireva Petty

Ozawa also participated in the operation of World of Autos
as a bookkeeper, having herself a 50 percent interest in
the corporation (R.294,295).

In October of 1975, appellant

employed one Raymond L. Bishop to buy cars for World of
Autos at car auctions in several

West~~n

states (R.l33-135).

Under the normal procedure followed by World of
Autos, when Ray Bishop bought a car he instructed the
seller to send a "draft" or envelope containing the
title to a bank in Utah (R.l36,137).

Ireva Petty Ozawa

would then pay the price of the car to the bank, receive
the title to the car, allowing it to be sold by World

-2-
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of Autos (R.298-301).

The bank charged World of Autos

a fee of $15.00 per draft (T.BO).
During 1975, World of Autos began having
difficulty paying for cars bought for resale purposes
(R.340-341).

To ease this problem, appellant determined

to set up his own finance company, Nordell Financial
Services, to eliminate having to pay a bank for handling
drafts (R.l40,30l-302).

Under this arrangement, drafts

sent to Nordell would be available to World of Autos such
that the latter would have the title to a car and could
re-sell the car before paying the dealer from whom World
of Autos bought the car (R.l42).
Appellant had Byron Fisher, a Salt Lake attorney,
draft articles of incorporation for Nordell and approached
Ray Bishop and appellant's mother,Fawn

s.

Noren, about

being incorporators of Nordell along with Ireva Petty
Ozawa (R.l47,212,326,247-248).

Appellant did not

want to be an incorporator of Nordell (R.260).

Ray

Bishop refused the request to become an incorporator and
appellant's brother apparently cautioned Fawn Noren not
to become involved (R.l47,248).
On the 22nd of January, 1976, Ireva Petty Ozawa
took the unsigned articles of incorporation to appellant
at the Salt Lake Auto Auction.

Without authority to do so,
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appellant forged the signatures of Ray Bishop and Fawn
Noren upon the articles (R.l49,193,228,311).

Ireva

Petty Ozawa then took the document to Ron Ferguson,
signed her name to it, and Mr. Ferguson notarized it
(R.309,177).

Ms. Ozawa proceeded to file the articles

of incorporation in the Secretary of State's Office
(R. 312).
Appellant told Ray Bishop to tell the dealers
from whom he bought the cars to begin sending drafts to
Nordell (R.l43).

Bishop was also instructed by appellant

to tell such dealers that World of Autos had been dealing
with Nordell for a year and a half (R.l44).

In addition,

appellant represented to Kenneth Don Nelson, the manager
of an auto auction in California, that Nordell was a
"group of local businessmen," and when Mr. Nelson contacted
the Secretary of State's Office to determine who incorporated
Nordell, appellant denied any relation to Ireva Petty
Ozawa or Fawn Noren (R.380-382).
ARGUHENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
RULING THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-503
(1953), AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO FILING
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION UPON WHICH
ARE FORGED SIGNATURES.
Appellant claims that the language of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-503

(1953), as qmended (all statutory references
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are to Utah Code Ann. unless otherwise indicated) which
covers any " • . . other writing for which the law provides
public records" does not encompass articles of incorporation.

The crux of appellant's claim is that the law of

Utah provides not for the "recording" but for the "filing"
of articles of incorporation; see e.g., Section 67-2-2(4).
Appellant argues that articles of incorporation
are not heavily relied upon by the public, as are deeds,
mortgages, and security instruments which are enumerated
in Section 76-6-503, and that the legislature thus did not
intend articles of incorporation to be encompassed within
"writing(s) for which the law provides public recording."
Respondent submits that the distinction between
"recording" and "filing" is merely semantical, and carries
no substantial significance.

Appellant admits at page 8 of

his brief that once articles of incorporation are filed,
they become a matter of public record, in the same way as
do deeds, mortgages, and security instruments.
In ruling on appellant's motion to quash the
information or to dismiss, Judge Croft discredited
appellant's contention that articles of incorporation
are not relied upon by the public:
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. . . I would say that the words
"or other writing for which the law
requires public recording" does cover
the filing of Articles of Incorporation
in the Secretary of State's Office because
the law requires those documents to be
filed in that office and indexed so the
public can go up there and examine them
and find out what the history of the
corporation 1s. What its makeup is and
what its Articles provide, who its
incorporators are, before that corporation
has any legal existence. . • •
(R.l28-129, emphasis added.)

The State also produced the

testimony of Kenneth Don Nelson, a manager of an auto
auction in California which dealt with World of Autos,
as to his attempt to obtain information about Nordell
from the articles of incorproation (R.376-388).

Mr.

Nelson came to Salt Lake City to check into over $70,000
worth of drafts sent to Nordell which had not been paid
for (R.379-380).

After being told by appellant that world

of Autos had paid Nordell for the drafts, Mr. Nelson
called the Secretary of State's Office and was told that
the articles of incorporation for Nordell showed that
Ireva Petty Ozawa and Fawn Noren were incorporators of
Nordell (R.380,381,382).
This conduct shows that those who dealt with
appellant and World of Autos could and did rely on the
articles of incorporation for Nordell Financial Services,
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which were a matter of public record, to determine if
Nordell and World of Autos were organized by the same
person.

In addition, Ray Bishop testified that the

auto auction in PhQenix, Arizona, refused to send
dra·fts to a private financial company but would deal
only through banking institutions (R.l72).

This

would indicate a distrust on the part of the sellers of
financial enterprises operated by the same persons who
operated the car dealership who bought cars from the
seller.

In summary, then, articles of incorporation

are documents relied upon by the public and for which
the law provides public recording, and Judge Croft
was correct in so holding.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT BOUND
TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-504 (1953), AS
AMENDED, BECAUSE THE SECTION DOES NOT
CONTROL THE SAME CONDUCT AS UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6-503 (1953), AS AMENDED.
Appellant contends that since Section 76-6-504,
prohibiting tampering with records, controls the same
conduct as does Section 76-6-503, but prescribes a
lesser penalty, the trial court should have submitted
the case to the jury under Section 76-6-504.

Conceding

that where there are two statutes which proscribe the
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same conduct, but impose different penalties, the
defendant is entitled to the lesser of the two
penalties; Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977),
respondent submits that Section 76-6-503 and Section
76-6-504 do not proscribe the same conduct.
It should be noted that the argument presented
in Point I of appellant's brief is inconsistent with
the contention urged in Point II.

In Point I, appellant

argues that Section 76-6-503 does not cover articles of
incorporation.

In Point II, he contends that articles

of incorporation are "within the purview" of Section
76-6-504.

Yet appellant contends that the two statutes

proscribe the same conduct, i.e.,

falsify~ng,

destroying,

removing, or concealing a public record.
Section 76-6-504 expressly excludes from its
proscription those writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503,
thus indicating that the conduct proscribed by the two
statutes is not identical because it refers to different
objects which are influenced by the conduct.

It is

also significant that Section 76-6-503 applies only to
documents for which the law provides for public recording,
while Section 76-6-504 applies more broadly to any record,
public or private.

Thus, this case is similar to Ramrnell

v. Smith, supra, in which the Utah Supreme Court after
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acknowledging the general rule, held that the two statutes
there involved did not proscribe the same conduct.

The

trial court was correct in refusing to submit the case to
the jury under Section 76-6-504 (R.392).
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-503 (1953) ,
AS AMENDED, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE.
Appellant contends that the statute under which
he was charged and convicted is unconstitutionally vague
because it is not clear to what extent the language "other
writing for which the law provides public recording" is
applicable to documents not enumerated in the statute.
The fact that the statute does not enumerate all possible
writings for which the law provides public recording is not
a constitutional infirmity.

Under constitutional

standards, a law is not unconstitutionally vague unless
it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited by the
statute.

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405

U.S. 156 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
408 (1972); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
Where, as here, the benefit of commonsense understanding reveals the general nature of the conduct prohibited,

-9-
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the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require complete certainty as to the meaning of
statutory terms.

In the case of People v. Perez, 561

P.2d 7 (Colo. 1977), the appellant challenged a statute
under authority of which his illicit massage parlor was
closed down as being unconstitutionally vague.

In

denying his appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated:
. a statute need not be drafted
with the greatest possible facility or
lucidity of expression if it meets the
minimal requirements of due process.
Given the benefit of commonsense understanding of the statutory terms [citation
omitted) the statute challenged here makes
reasonably clear to those intended to be
affected what conduct is within its scope.
561 P.2d 7, 10.

The Court reasoned that although the

challenged phrase "public or private place of prostitution"
was not defined with mathematical precision, it was not
unfair to appellant who "deliberately chose to approach
the area of proscribed conduct and assumed the risk
of crossing the line."

Perez, supra at p. 10.

Several other courts, including this Court,
have recognized that due process does not demand that
statutes be drafted with the greatest possible exactitude.
In United States v. Maude, 481 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the Court wrote:
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The void-for-vagueness doctrine is
not a principle designed to convert into
a constitutional dilemma the practical
difficulties in drawing criminal statutes
both general enough to take into account
a variety of human conduct and sufficiently
specific to provide fair warning that
certain kinds of conduct are prohibitive.
481 F.2d 1062, 1068.

See also Colten v. Kentucky, 407

u.s.

104 (1972).
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561
(1952), cited by appellant, this Court also recognized
that:
The limitations of language are
such that neither absolute exactitude
nor complete precision of meaning are to
be expected, and such standard cannot
be required.
250 P.2d 561, 564.

Respondent submits that Section

76-6-503 meets the minimal requirements of due process in
that it does not force men of reasonable intelligence to
guess what conduct is prohibited.
Although the statute does not enumerate all
the writings for which the law provides public recording,
it does give examples.

As was shown in Point I, infra,

articles of incorporation, although they are "filed"
with the Secretary of State's Office, become a matter of
public record after they are filed.

It is a matter of

common knowledge that forging signatures upon a document
which becomes a public record is a culpable act.

Further,
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even if appellant had actually relied on the distinction
between "filing" and "recording" delineated in Point I
of his appellate brief, to conclude that his actions did
not fall within the statute, such reliance would have
been unreasonable and as in Perez, supra, would have
constituted a deliberate choice to approach the area of
prohibited conduct and an assumption of the risk of
crossing the line.

Thus, as it applies to appellant in

the case at bar, Section 76-6-503 is not unconstitutionally
vague.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CGr1MIT
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 1-iOTION FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT.
At the close of the respondent's case-in-chief
at trial, appellant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal
on the ground that respondent failed to make a prima facie
case in failing to prove an intent to deceive or injure
others on the part of appellant (R.223).

Judge Croft ruled

that the respondent had proved that appellant forged
signatures on the articles of incorporation before filing
them and that the inference from this conduct is that
appellant intended to deceive people (R.226).
The standard to be applied in determining when
the trial court has a duty to direct a verdict of acquittal
is stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d 543, Trial § 553:
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In a criminal case it is the
duty of the trial court to direct an
acquittal where there is no substantial
evidence of the guilt of the accused.
It has been held that the court cannot
refuse to direct a verdict of acquittal
where there is no evidence reasonably
tending to prove that the offense was
committed, where the defendant is
clearly not guilty, where the only
evidence against the defendant is
incompetent, where there is no competent
evidence to sustain a conviction, or where
the evidence wholly fails to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime,
or creates a mere suspicion of guilt, or is
not sufficient to warrant a reasonable
conclusion of guilt.
It is further stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d 544, Trial § 553, that:
There is no duty on the part of the
court to direct an acquittal where there
is sufficient evidence to warrant the
jury's believing beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, or where there
is substantial evidence from which guilt
may legitimately be found.
This Court has adopted the later test in its decisions
specifically addressing the issue of when it is proper for
the trial court to direct a verdict of acquittal.

In

State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954),
the Court upheld a conviction of second degree murder in
spite of a challenge to the trial court's failure to direct
acquittal.

The Court there wrote:
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It has been repeatedly held by
this court that upon a motion to
dismiss or to direct a verdict of not
guilty for lack of evidence that
the trial court does not consider the
weight of the evidence or credibility
of the witnesses, but determines the
naked legal proposition of law, whether
there is any substantial evidence of
the guilt of the accused, and all
reasonable inferences are to be taken
in favor of the state • • . [I)f there
is before the court evidence upon which
reasonable men might differ as to
whether the defendant is or is not
guilty, he may deny the motion.
272 P.2d 195, 198.

See also State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d

95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960); State v. Woodall, 6 Utah 2d 8, 305
P.2d 473

(1956); and State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355

P.2d 57 (1960).

Further, in State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229,

240 P.2d 504 (1952), this Court held that there can be no
error in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal where there
is competent evidence from which the jury could find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
charged.
Respondent submits that in the case at bar, there
was sufficient competent evidence adduced at trial from
which the jury could find appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In the case of State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah
1976) , this Court established the burden which the prosecution must bear to establish a prima facie case:
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In order to submit a question to the
jury it is necessary that the prosecution
establish a prima facie case. That is, it
is necessary to present some evidence of
every element needed to make out a cause
of action, and it has long been established
that such may be proven by direct and by
circumstantial evidence. But the evidence
required need be only that which is sufficient
to conform to the statutory definition of the
crime charged, and the "element of each
offense" is defined as (a) conduct, attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct; and (b)
the requisite mental state.
554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976).
are:

The elements of Section 76-6-503

(a) the actus reus of falsifying, destroying, removing

or concealing a writing for which the law provides public
recording; and (b) the mens rea is an intent to deceive or
injury anyone.
Appellant did not challenge at trial the
fact that he did forge or "falsify" the signatures on
the articles of incorporation (R.228).

Indeed, this fact

was established by a defense witness, Ireva Petty Ozawa,
on direct examination (R.3ll).

Thus, the "conduct"

element of the crime was made out beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In addition to the inference to be drawn from
appellant's conduct of filing articles of incorporation
with forged signatures that appellant intended to deceive
people, the state also produced evidence of a specific
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attempt to deceive a person with whom appellant dealt.
Kenneth Don Nelson, the manager of the Bay City Auto
Auction in California was told by appellant that Nordell
Financial Services was a "group of local businessmen"
with whom appellant had no connection (R.380-382).
Appellant even denied knowing who Fawn Noren, his
mother, was (R.382).
When this conduct is viewed against the
backdrop of Nordell being unable to pay for drafts,
owing Mr. Nelson at the time over $70,000, the intent
of appellant to conceal the fact that Nordell was
incorporated and operated by the same persons that
operated vlorld of Autos is apparent.

Further, Ireva

Petty Ozawa testified that World of Autos was having
financial difficulty even before the articles of
incorporation for Nordell were filed

(R.342).

Finally,

appellant told Ray Bishop to misrepresent to car dealers
from whor.t he bought cars that Horld of Autos had been
dealing with Nordell Financial Services for one and one
half years soon after Nordell was formed (R.l44).

The

evidence viewed collectively shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that by forging the signatures of others on the
articles of incorporation but not signing the articles
himself, appellant intended to deceive others with whom
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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he dealt into thinking that Nordell Financial Services
and World of Autos were functionally separate businesses.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument and authority,
respondent respectfully submits that the conviction and
sentence of the appellant were proper and should be
affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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